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Abstract
The Stable Matching Problem with Couples
(SMP-C) is a ubiquitous real-world extension of the
stable matching problem (SMP) involving comple-
mentarities. Although SMP can be solved in poly-
nomial time, SMP-C is NP-Complete. Hence, it is
not clear which, if any, of the theoretical results sur-
rounding the canonical SMP problem apply in this
setting. In this paper, we use a recently-developed
SAT encoding to solve SMP-C exactly. This allows
us to enumerate all stable matchings for any given
instance of SMP-C. With this tool, we empirically
evaluate some of the properties that have been hy-
pothesized to hold for SMP-C.
We take particular interest in investigating if, as
the size of the market grows, the percentage of in-
stances with unique stable matchings also grows.
While we did not find this trend among the random
problem instances we sampled, we did find that the
percentage of instances with an resident optimal
matching seems to more closely follow the trends
predicted by previous conjectures. We also de-
fine and investigate resident Pareto optimal stable
matchings, finding that, even though this is impor-
tant desideratum for the deferred acceptance style
algorithms previously designed to solve SMP-C,
they do not always find one.
We also investigate strategy-proofness for SMP-C,
showing that even if only one stable matching ex-
ists, residents still have incentive to misreport their
preferences. However, if a problem has a resident
optimal stable matching, we show that residents
cannot manipulate via truncation.
1 Introduction
Stable matching problems are ubiquitous, with many real-
world applications, ranging from dating markets, to labour
markets, to the school choice problem. Arguably the most
well-known of these applications is the residency match-
ing problem [Niederle et al., 2008; Roth, 1984; Abdulka-
diroglu et al., 2005], instantiated in the large National Res-
ident Matching Program (NRMP), among others. Impor-
tantly, these markets have adapted to the needs of their par-
ticipants over the years, allowing them to more richly ex-
press their preferences, or guarantee certain properties of the
match valuable to participants [NRMP, 2013]. To address the
problem of couples wanting to coordinate their placements,
the NRMP began allowing couples to jointly express their
preferences over residency programs. We call the resulting
matching problem the Stable Matching Problem with Cou-
ples (SMP-C).
As with the standard SMP, the goal of SMP-C is to find a
matching such that no pair (one from each side of the mar-
ket) has an incentive to defect from their assigned placement.
Such a matching is called stable. In their seminal paper on
stable matching, Gale and Shapley provide a polytime De-
ferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm guaranteed to find a sta-
ble, male-optimal (resident-optimal) matching [1962]. They
also proved many useful properties of SMP; e.g., a unique
stable matching always exists, and a stable resident-optimal
matching always exists (a matching is resident-optimal if no
resident is better off in any other stable matching).
However, when a pair of doctors are allowed to jointly
specify their rankings, many of these desirable properties no
longer hold. In particular, SMP-C is NP-complete [Ronn,
1990]. Also, a stable matching might not exist. Even
when it does exist a resident-optimal matching might not ex-
ist. SMP-C is not the only NP-complete extension of SMP.
Previous literature on these other NP-complete extensions
has investigated techniques that are not guaranteed to re-
turn stable matchings, such as local search techniques (e.g.,
[Marx and Schlotter, 2011; Gelain et al., 2010]). Another
approach has entailed encoding these NP-complete stable
matching problems (e.g., the stable matching problem with
incomplete lists and ties) into other NP-complete formalisms
such as constraint satisfaction problems (CSP) or satisfiabil-
ity (SAT) (e.g., [Gent and Prosser, 2002; Gent et al., 2001;
Unsworth and Prosser, 2005]). The advantage of such encod-
ings is that effective solvers exist for CSP and SAT. However,
these works do not address SMP-C.
Previous work on SMP-C has mainly focused on provid-
ing sound but not complete algorithms that extend the DA
algorithm to deal with couples [Roth and Peranson, 1999;
Kojima et al., 2013]. A new SAT encoding for SMP-C
was recently developed [Drummond et al., 2015], showing
very promising results when run on a competitive SAT solver
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[Biere, 2013]. This encoding, SAT-E, scales fairly well, and is
sometimes able find stable matchings for problems on which
the DA-style algorithms cannot find any. Importantly, this
new SAT encoding allows for flexibility unavailable in DA-
style algorithms: adding new constraints and objectives can
be as simple as adding another constraint to the encoding.
In this paper, we use this flexibility to allow us to enu-
merate all possible stable matches of an instance of SMP-C.
We also introduce a constraint that allows us to, given a sta-
ble solution to SMP-C, determine if that matching is resident
Pareto optimal, and if it is not, find a resident Pareto optimal
matching. This new machinery allows us to empirically eval-
uate interesting properties of SMP-C. In particular, we are
interested in the following properties: when do instances of
SMP-C have a unique matching? If an instance has multiple
stable matchings, when is there a resident optimal matching?
How does the existence of a stable matching change as the
percentage of couples in the market increases?
Previous theoretical work has addressed some of these
questions; Ashlagi et al. and Kojima et al. proved theo-
retical results regarding the guaranteed existence of a sta-
ble matching, if the size of the market grows sufficiently
faster than the percentage of couples in the matching [2014;
2013]. Immorlica and Mahdian proved that, for SMP, and a
fixed length ROL (with everyone drawing from some given
distribution), the chance of drawing a problem with a unique
stable matching goes to 1 as the size of the market goes to in-
finity. However, to our knowledge, no analogous results exist
for SMP-C. We thus create our experiments in an attempt to
simulate the settings in these papers.
Also, previous work has conjectured that some of the prop-
erties present in SMP may carry over to SMP-C. Roth and
Peranson hypothesized that the reason that they see few op-
portunities for strategic behaviour in their data is that there are
few stable matchings in large SMP-C markets [1999]. Fur-
thermore, Roth and Peranson cite that strategy-proofness and
resident optimality are desirable properties for stable match-
ings.
In this paper, we first provide a theoretical contribution,
showing that, for SMP-C, we are not guaranteed resident
strategy-proofness, even in a problem with a unique stable
matching. We do show, however, when a matching has res-
ident optimal solution, residents cannot manipulate via trun-
cation; they must manipulate via reordering their preferences.
We thus show that, for SMP-C, uniqueness and resident op-
timality are both insufficient for strategy-proofness, but, in
certain situations, it is “harder” for the residents to manipu-
late. We then provide two extensions to the already existing
SAT-E encoding for SMP-C, allowing us to enumerate all sta-
ble matches and find a resident Pareto optimal match. We use
these tools to empirically explore the space of SMP-C solu-
tions. Our experiments suggest that Roth and Peranson’s ob-
servation that there were few instances where residents could
improve by truncation is due to the high fraction of instances
that have a resident optimal matching, a fraction that appears
to increase with instance size.
2 Background
We cast our formalization of SMP-C (stable matching prob-
lem with couples) in terms of the well known residency
matching problem, a labour market where doctors are placed
into hospital residency programs [Roth and Peranson, 1999].
Informally, doctors wish to be placed into (matched with)
some hospital program, and programs wish to accept some
number of doctors. Both doctors and hospitals have prefer-
ences over who they are matched with; expressed as ranked
order lists (ROLs). Some doctors are paired into couples, and
these couples provide a joint ROL specifying their joint pref-
erences. Both doctors and hospitals can provide incomplete
lists, any alternative not listed is considered to be unaccept-
able. That is, they would rather not be matched at all than
matched to an alternative not on their ROL. The SMP-C prob-
lem to find a stable matching, such that no doctor-hospital
pair has an incentive to defect from the assigned matching.
2.1 SMP-C
More formally, let D be a set of doctors and P be a set of
programs. Since there is a preference to be unmatched over
an unacceptable match, we use nil to denote this “doctor” or
“program” alternative: matching a program p to nil indicates
that p has an unfilled slot while matching a doctor d to nil
indicates that d was not placed into any program. We use D+
and P+ to denote the sets D ∪ {nil} and P ∪ {nil} respec-
tively.
The doctors are divided into two disjoint subsets, S ⊆ D
and D \ S . S is the set of single doctors and D \ S is the
set of doctors that are in couple relationships. We specify
the couples by a set of pairs C ⊆ (D \ S ) × (D \ S ). If
(d1, d2) ∈ C we say that d1 and d2 are each other’s partner.
We require that every doctor who is not single (i.e., every
doctor in D \ S ) have one and only one partner in C .
Each program p ∈ P has an integer quota capp > 0. This
quota determines the maximum number of doctors p can ac-
cept (i.e., p’s capacity).
Everyone participating in the matching market has prefer-
ences over their alternatives. Each participant a specifies their
preferences in a ROL which lists a’s preferred matches from
most preferred to least preferred. The ROLs of single doc-
tors d ∈ S contain programs from P+; the ROLs of couples
c ∈ C contain pairs of programs from P+ × P+; and the
ROLs of programs p ∈ P contain doctors from D+. Every
ROL is terminated by nil (couple ROLS are terminated by
(nil ,nil)) since being unmatched is always the least preferred
option, but is preferred to any option not on participant’s a’s
ROL.
The order of items on a’s ROL defines a partial ordering
relation where x a y indicates that x appears before y on
a’s ROL or x = y. We define a, a, and a in terms of a
and equality in the standard way. We say that x is acceptable
to a if x a nil . (Note that unacceptable matches are not
ordered by a.)
We define a choice function Chp() for programs p ∈ P .
Given a set of doctors R, Chp(R) returns the subset of R
that p would prefer to accept. Chp(R) is the maximal sub-
set of R such that for all d ∈ Chp(R), d p nil , for all
d′ ∈ R−Chp(R), d p d′, and |Chp(R)| ≤ capp . It is con-
venient to give the null program a choice function as well:
Chnil(O) = O, i.e., nil will accept any and all matches.
We use the notation ranked(a) to denote the set of options
that a could potentially be matched with. For single doc-
tors d and programs p this is simply the ROLs of d (rold)
and p (rolp). For a doctor that is part of a couple (d1, d2),
ranked(d1 ) = {p1|∃p2.(p1, p2) ∈ rol (d1,d2)} ∪ {nil} and
similarly for d2. Note that nil ∈ ranked(a).
Finally, we use the function ranka(x) to find the index of
match x in a’s rol : ranka(x) = i iff x appears at index i
(zero-based) on a’s ROL, rola, or |rola| if x does not appear
on rola. Also we use rola as an indexable vector, e.g., if x is
acceptable to a then rola[ranka(x)] = x.
2.2 Stable Matchings
Definition 1 (Matching). A matching µ is a mapping from
D to P+. We say that a doctor d is matched to a program p
under µ if µ(d) = p, and that p is matched to d if d ∈ µ−1(p).
We want to find a matching where no doctor-program pair
has an incentive to defect. We call the pairs that do have an
incentive to defect blocking pairs. First we define the condi-
tion willAccept(p,R, µ) to mean that program p would pre-
fer to accept a set of doctorsR over its current match µ−1(p):
willAccept(p,R, µ) ≡ R ⊆ Chp(µ−1(p) ∪ R). Note that if
p is already matched to R under µ then p will accept R.
Definition 2 (Blocking Pairs for a Matching µ). 1. A sin-
gle doctor d ∈ S and a program p ∈ P is a
blocking pair for µ if and only if p d µ(d) and
willAccept(p, {d}, µ)
2. A couple c = (d1, d2) ∈ C and a program pair
(p1, p2) ∈ P+ × P+ with p1 6= p2 is a blocking pair
for µ if and only if (p1, p2) (d1,d2) (µ(d1), µ(d2)),
willAccept(p1, {d1}, µ), and willAccept(p2, {d2}, µ).
3. A couple c = (d1, d2) and a program p ∈ P is
a blocking pair for µ if and only if (p, p) (d1,d2)
(µ(d1), µ(d2)) and willAccept(p, {d1, d2}, µ).
Definition 3 (Individually Rational Matching). A matching
µ is individually rational if and only if (a) for all d ∈ S ,
µ(d) d nil , (b) for all c = (d1, d2) ∈ C , (µ(d1), µ(d2)) c
(nil ,nil), and (c) for all p ∈ P , |µ−1(p)| ≤ capp and for all
d ∈ µ−1(p) we have that d p nil .
Definition 4 (Stable Matching). A matching µ is stable if and
only if it is individually rational and no blocking pairs for it
exist.
2.3 Residence Preferred Matchings
The set of stable matchings can be quite large. When there are
no couples (i.e., in SMP) this set is always non-empty [Gale
and Shapley, 1962] and has a nice structure: it forms a lattice
under the partial order R defined below [Knuth, 1976].
Definition 5 (Residence Preferred Matchings). A matching
µ1 is resident preferred to another µ2 when for all a ∈ S ∪C
we have that µ1(a) a µ2(a). We denote this relationship as
µ1 R µ2. We also define R, ≺R, and R in terms of R
and equality in the standard way. When µ1 R µ2 we say
that µ1 dominates µ2.
In other words, µi R µ2 if every doctor and couple gets
the same or a better match in µ1 as in µ3 and at least one
doctor or couple gets a better match.
The lattice structure and the fact there can only be a finite
number of matchings means that for SMP there is always a
resident-optimal matching.
Definition 6 (Resident Optimal Matching). We say that a
matching µ is resident optimal, written Ropt(µ) when µ is
stable and µ R µ′ for all other stable matchings µ′ (µ dom-
inates all other stable matchings).
Note that, we restrict the resident-optimal matching to be
stable. It can be observed that for any resident r (couple
(r1, r2)) µ(r) ((µ(r1), µ(r2)) is the best match offered by any
stable matching whenRopt(µ).
Resident-optimality is generally cited as an important
property for stable matching algorithms (e.g., [Gale and
Shapley, 1962; Roth and Peranson, 1999]). In the presence of
couples however, stable matchings might not exist and even
when they do there have no lattice structure under R. How-
ever, the R is still well defined and for SMP-C leads to po-
tentially multiple Pareto optimal matchings.
Definition 7 (Resident Pareto Optimal Matchings). We
say that a matching µ is resident Pareto optimal, written
RPopt(µ) when µ is stable and there does not exist another
stable matching µ′ such that µ′ R µ′.
It is easy to see that in SMP-C every stable matching µ
either is an RPopt or is dominated by an RPopt matching.
This means that an SMP-C instance has an Ropt matching if
and only if it has a uniqueRPopt matching. As we will see in
Section 5 it is often the case that SMP-C instances have more
than oneRPopt matching (and thus noRopt matching).
3 Strategy-Proofness andRopt Existence for
SMP-C
For an SMP instance the mechanism that returns the Ropt
matching in response to the stated preferences is strategy-
proof with respect to the residents. That is, it is a dominant
strategy for each resident to state their true preferences [Roth
and Sotomayor, 1992].
To our knowledge, no strategy-proofness results exist for
SMP-C. However, this result for SMP leads us to hypothe-
size that if we restrict our attention to SMP instances in which
an Ropt matching exists, then a mechanism that returns the
Ropt matching is strategy-proof. Unfortunately, this is not
true; furthermore, the even stronger condition of there be-
ing a unique stable matching for a problem instance doesn’t
guarantee strategy-proofness for the residents (let alone the
hospitals). However, we do show that when there is an Ropt
matching, residents have no incentive to misreport their pref-
erences via truncation.
Theorem 1. Restricting to instances of SMP-C in which an
Ropt matching exists, let y() be a mechanism that maps from
such an instance to the Ropt matching. Then y is strategy-
proof for residents if residents are only allowed to manipulate
via truncations. However, y might not be strategy-proof if
residents are allowed to manipulate via reordering.
Proof. Let µ∗ be theRopt matching.
Part I: Truncations are strategy-proof. Suppose resident or
couple d truncates its preferences at program or pair of pro-
grams p. Let Ω be the set of stable matchings before the trun-
cation and let Ω′ be the set of stable matchings after the trun-
cation. Because d’s preferences above the truncation point
are the same after truncation, any matching µ ∈ Ω′ where
µ(d) 6= nil (resp. µ(d) 6= (nil ,nil) for a couple d) is in
Ω: the stability conditions contributed by other residents and
couples are the same after d’s truncation. However, Ω′ may
contain stable matchings where d is matched to nil that are
not in Ω. Thus {µ ∈ Ω′ : µ(d) 6= nil} ⊆ Ω.
There are two cases: either 1) d truncates below µ∗(d) or 2)
d truncates at or above µ∗(d). In the former, it can be seen that
µ∗ is a stable matching of Ω′ and the only matches in Ω′ not
in Ω have d matched to nil . Hence, µ∗ is an Ropt matching
for Ω′ and d cannot improve. In the latter, Ω′ consists of
matchings where d is matched to nil because any µ ∈ Ω′
such that µ(d) d µ∗(d) would be in Ω and would contradict
µ∗’sRopt status. Hence, d cannot improve in this case either.
Part II: Reordering is not strategy-proof. We provide a
counterexample. See Figure 1. The preferences provided
above the line show doctors’ and programs’ true preferences.
Couples are identified by their doctor-doctor pair, and give
joint preferences as expected. Given these true preferences,
only one stable matching exists (shown in the third column
above the line). However, even though only one stable match-
ing exists (and thus this matching is Ropt ), the single doctor
r0 has incentive to misreport preferences via reordering. In-
stead of reporting a  b  c  d (r0’s true preferences) r0
can be matched to b instead of c by reporting b  d  c  a.
(All other participants in the market report their true prefer-
ences.) This results in the matching seen in the third column
below the line, a matching that is not stable under the original
preferences, where single doctor r0 is better off than when
they reported their true preferences.
Roth and Peranson investigate strategy-proofness for both
residents and hospitals empirically in the NRMP setting
[1999]. They do this via truncations. In their setting, they do
find that residents can benefit (albeit minimally) from trun-
cating their true preferences. We then hypothesize that this
is due either: i) the instances in their setting frequently do
not contain an Ropt matching, or ii) their algorithm (RP99)
does not find the Ropt matching even when it does exist. In
Section 5 we will see that both of these situations can occur.
That is, on many problems noRopt matching exists (the best
one can do is an RPopt matching). And even when an Ropt
matching does exist, their algorithm might not find it, report-
ing some other stable matching instead.
4 Solving SMP-C
In this section we examine solution methods for finding sta-
ble matchings for SMP-C. The standard approach has been
to find an extension of the deferred acceptance algorithm that
can handle couples. However, these extensions are incom-
plete: they are unable to determine whether or not a stable
matching exists, and even when a stable matching does exist
they might not be able to find one.
Since SMP-C is known to be NP-Complete [Ronn, 1990]
it is also possible to encode it as another NP-Complete prob-
lem. In particular, it can be encoded as a SAT (satisfiability)
problem. The advantage of doing this is that there has been
a great deal of work on SAT solvers and state-of-the-art SAT
solvers are routinely able to solve SAT problems involving
millions of clauses.1 The advantage of encoding SMP-C to
SAT and then using a SAT solver is that this approach is com-
plete: given sufficient compute resources it will either find a
stable matching or prove that none exists.
4.1 Existing DA Algorithms for SMP-C
The basic principle of DA algorithms [Gale and Shapley,
1962] is that members of one side of the market propose down
their ROLs while the other side either rejects those proposals
or holds them until they see a better proposal: once all pro-
posals have been made that side accepts the proposal they
have not rejected (acceptance of proposals is deferred until
the end).
Roth and Peranson develop a DA algorithm, RP99, capable
of dealing with couples [1999]. This well known algorithm
has been used with considerable success in practice, includ-
ing most famously for finding matches for the NRMP which
typically involves about 30,000 doctors [NRMP, 2013]. Us-
ing the description in [Roth and Peranson, 1999] we have im-
plemented RP99. RP99 employs an iterative scheme. After
computing a stable matching for all single doctors, couples
are added one at a time and a new stable matching computed
after each addition. The algorithm uses DA at each stage to
find these stable matchings. Matching a couple can make pre-
viously made matches unstable and in redoing these matches
the algorithm might start to cycle. Hence, cycle checking (or
a timeout) is sometimes needed to terminate the algorithm.
Kojima et al. develop a simple “sequential couples algo-
rithm” [2013]. This algorithm is analyzed to prove that the
probability of a stable matchings existing goes to one under
certain assumptions. However, this simple algorithm is not
useful in practice as it declares failure under very simple con-
ditions. Kojima et al. also provide a more practical DA al-
gorithm, KPR, that they use in their experiments. We have
implemented KPR. The main difference between KPR and
RP99 is that KPR deals with all couples at the same time—it
does not attempt to compute intermediate stable matchings.
Interestingly, this makes KPR much more successful (and ef-
ficient) in our experiments.
Finally, Ashlagi et al. extend the analysis of Kojima et
al., developing a more sophisticated “Sorted Deferred Accep-
tance Algorithm” and analyzing its behaviour [2014]. This
algorithm is designed mainly to be amenable to theoretical
analysis rather than for practical application. We have not
implemented this algorithm so we do not include any empiri-
cal results about its performance.
4.2 Solving SMP via SAT
We have developed an effective encoding of SMP-C into SAT.
This encoding and its performance is reported on in [Drum-
1Of course, since SAT is NP-Complete these solvers can also be
foiled by small SAT instances. Nevertheless, they often exhibit very
good performance on instances that arise from real world problems.
Doctor preferences Program preferences Unique stable matching
r0 : a  b  c  d a : r3  r0  r1 µ(r0) = c
(r1, r2) : (b, e)  (a, d) b : r1  r0 µ((r1, r2)) = (b, e)
(r3, r4) : (a, d)  (c, e) c : r3  r0 µ((r3, r4)) = (a, d)
d : r0  r2  r4
e : r4  r2
Doctor preferences Program preferences Unique stable matching
r0 : b  d  c  a a : r3  r0  r1 µ(r0) = b
(r1, r2) : (b, e)  (a, d) b : r1  r0 µ((r1, r2)) = (a, d)
(r3, r4) : (a, d)  (c, e) c : r3  r0 µ((r3, r4)) = (c, e)
d : r0  r2  r4
e : r4  r2
Figure 1: Counterexample for Strategy-Proofness in the Reordering Case
mond et al., 2015].2
We call this encoding SAT-E, and given an SMP-C instance
〈D ,C ,P ,ROLs〉, where ROLs is the set of all participant
ROLs, SAT-E(〈D ,C ,P ,ROLs〉) can be viewed as a func-
tion that returns a SAT encoding in CNF (conjunctive nor-
mal form), which is the input format taken by modern SAT
solvers.
There are three things to know about SAT-E.
1. For any SMP-C instance I = 〈D ,C ,P ,ROLs〉, the
satisfying models of SAT-E stand in a one-to-one cor-
respondence with the stable models of I. This allows us
to enumerate all stable models (see below).
2. SAT-E includes the set of propositional variables md[p]
one for each d ∈ D and p ∈ D such that p d nil .
In any satisfying model, pi, md[p] is true if and only if
µ(d) = p in the stable matching µ corresponding to pi.
3. SAT-E also includes the set of propositional variables
mc[i] for each c ∈ C and i in the range [0, |rolc − 1|]
where rolc is c’s ROL. In any satisfying model, pi, mc[i]
is true if and only if in µ, the stable matching corre-
sponding to pi, c is matched to a program pair they rank
i or above in their ROL.
Given SAT-E and the above three facts we can develop two
simple yet powerful algorithms: one for enumerating all sta-
ble models and the other for finding a Pareto Optimal match-
ing, an RPopt matching, that dominates a stable matching
µ.
Algorithm 1 is our algorithm for enumerating all stable
models. It uses a sequence of calls to a SAT solver to do this.
It first constructs the SAT-E encoding of the SMP-C instance
then enters a loop. Each time through the loop a new stable
model is found by the SAT solver, and a blocking clause c
2For the reader’s convenience we have included a description of
this encoding in the appendix. See [Drummond et al., 2015] for full
details.
ALGORITHM 1: Enumerate all stable models of an inputted
SMP-C instance
Input: I = 〈D ,C ,P ,ROLs〉 an SMP-C instance
Output: Enumerate all stable models of a I
1 CNF ← SAT-E(I)
2 while true do
3 (sat?,pi) ← SatSolve(CNF)
/* SatSolve returns the status (sat or unsat) and a satisfying
model pi if sat */
4 if sat? then
5 µ← stable matching corresponding to pi
6 c← {¬md[p] |µ(d) = p}
7 CNF ← CNF ∪ {c}
8 enumerate(µ)
9 else
10 return // All stable matchings enumerated.
is added to the SAT-E encoding. This clause c is a disjunc-
tion that says that no future solution is allowed to return the
same stable model (one of the mappings µ(d) = p of the
corresponding stable model must be different, i.e., one of the
variables md[p] made true by µ must be false in every future
matching).
Algorithm 2 is our algorithm for finding aRPopt matching
that dominates an inputted stable matching µ. The algorithm
takes an SMP-C instances as input and constructs the SAT-E
encoding for that instance. It then blocks the match µ from
being a satisfying solution (using the same kind of clause as
Algo. 1) and also forces the next match found to be R the
current match. It accomplishes this by adding a clause for
each single doctor d that says that d must be matched to a
program it ranks at least as high as µ(d), and for every couple
c a (unit) clause that says that c must be matched to a pair of
programs it ranks at least as highly as µ(c). This causes the
new match to be R to the current match, and since the new
match cannot be equal it must beR the current match. That
ALGORITHM 2: Given an SMP-C instance and a stable matching
µ find a dominatingRPopt matching.
Input: I = 〈D ,C ,P ,ROLs〉 an SMP-C instance and µ a stable
matching for I
Output: AnRPopt matching for I that dominates µ
1 while true do
2 CNF ← SAT-E(I)
3 c← {¬md[p] |µ(d) = p}
4 CNF ← CNF ∪ {c}
5 for d ∈ S do
6 cd ← {md[p] | p d µ(d)}
7 CNF ← CNF ∪ {cd}
8 for c ∈ C do
9 cc ← {mc[i] | i = rankc(µ(c))}
10 CNF ← CNF ∪ {cd}
11 (sat?,pi) ← SatSolve(CNF)
12 if sat? then
13 µ← stable matching corresponding to pi
14 else
15 return µ // Return last match found.
is, the new match must dominate the current match. If no
dominating match can be found, the current match is RPopt
and we return it.
5 Empirical Results
In this section we report on various experiments we per-
formed. We used the state-of-the art SAT solver LingeLing
[Biere, 2013] to solve our encoding SAT-E; Algorithm 1 to
find all stable matches; and our implementation of the two DA
algorithms RP99 and KPR, described in Section 4.1, when
testing the effectiveness of DA algorithms.
5.1 Statistical models
We experiment with randomly generated SMP-C instances.
In our experiments we confine our attention to instances in
which all program quotas are 1. So these are one-to-one
matching problems with couples.
We generate ordered lists from sets using a common ran-
dom sampling procedure. To obtain an ordered list L of size
k from a set S, given that we already generated the first i
items, we draw elements from S independently and uniformly
at random until we find an element e that does not already ap-
pear in L. Once we have selected such an e it becomes the
i+ 1’th item of L. This process stops when L has k items.
We use market sizes of size n where n ranges from 200
to 20,000, and varying percentages x of couples. For each
n we include n doctors in D and n programs in P . Among
the doctors we mark 1 − x percent as being singles and the
remaining x percent are paired into couples. (Thus we have
x ∗ n/2 couples and n − x ∗ n singles). For each single we
randomly generate an ordered ROL of length 5 from P (using
the procedure described above), each couple has an ROL of
length 15 randomly generated from P+×P+−{(nil ,nil)},
and each program has an ROL that includes all doctors that
ranked it (including one member of a couple) and is randomly
generated from that same set. For each setting of the parame-
ters, we drew 50 problem instances.
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Figure 2: Fraction of satisfiable instances drawn, varying the
fraction of couples in the match, and the size of the market.
5.2 Experiments
Existence of a Stable Matching in SMP-C
Our first experiment involves running a SAT solver on each
SMP-C instance. This allows us to determine how often
these instances had a stable match. Figure 2 shows the trend.
We see that as the fraction of residents who are in couples
increases, the fraction of satisfiable instances drops fairly
rapidly. Interestingly, it appears as though this effect is inde-
pendent of the size of the market; for all market sizes drawn,
the fraction of satisfiable instances is fairly consistent, and
follows the same trend. These results agree with the predic-
tions of Ashlagi et al. who showed that in a random model
similar but not identical to ours whenever the number of cou-
ples grows linearly with market size, the probability of no
stable matching existing is a constant. This agrees with our
data that market size has little effect. There model was not,
however, able to predict what that probability might be, nor
how it might change as the percentage of couples increases.
It can also be noted that the results presented here (20,000
couples with an average single’s ROL of size 5) are of a size
comparable to the NRMP, where there are 34,355 residents
with an average single’s ROL of size 11 [NRMP, 2013]. On
NRMP Roth and Peranson [1999] remark that historically no
instance was found not to have a stable matching. This might
arise from (a) the percentage of couples being very small for
NRMP, or (b) extra structure in this real problem not present
in our random problems. If the cause is (a) there might be
practical concerns for the ability of clearinghouse mecha-
nisms to find stable matchings if the percentage of couples
rises.
Existence of a Unique Stable Matching in SMP-C
Figure 3 shows the fraction of instances that had a unique
stable matchings as the size of the market increases, and as
the percentage of the couples in the market increases. Impor-
tantly, this figure only counts the fraction of instances with a
unique matching among those instances that have at least one
matching. This data was generated by running Algo. 1.
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Figure 3: Fraction of satisfiable instances with single stable
matching, varying size of the market and percentage of cou-
ples in the market.
As shown in Figure 2, the fraction of instances where a
stable matching exists changes as the percentage of couples
in the market changes. So to remove that underlying trend,
we only look instances where a stable matching is known to
exist.
Note that, while these curves generally mimic the pattern
we’d expect to see (the fraction of unique matchings tends to
increase as the market size gets larger), the curve appears to
level out and reach an asymptote much earlier than expected.
In our experiments, no setting reached more than 84% unique
matchings.
Immorlica and Mahdian proved that, for SMP (where at
least one stable matching is always true) with fixed length
ROLs (and everyone drawing from some given distribution),
the chance of drawing a problem with only one stable match-
ing goes to 1 as the size of the market goes to infinity [2005].
Our trends for SMP-C, however, appear somewhat asymp-
totic, especially when the percentage of couples is low. It thus
appears that, at least for the size of problems relative to the
size of ROL investigated here, that the Immorlica and Mah-
dian results do not apply. This could be because their results
give very large bounds that require the size of the problems to
be much larger than drawn here. So our results might not be
on sufficiently large markets to capture the phenomenon they
describe. Alternately, this could be because their results do
not hold for SMP-C.
As an aside, when comparing the fraction of unique satis-
fiable instances out of all problem instances drawn, the num-
bers look even worse; with a market size of 20,000 and 20%
couples, the percentage of problems drawn with only one sta-
ble matching drops to 50%.
Properties of the Set of Matchings for SMP-C
We next investigate the properties of the set of matchings of
each SMP-C instance as generated by Algorithm 1. We have
shown that, at least under the settings explored in this paper,
unique stable matches are not as common as we may have
hypothesized. We also have proven that, even if a unique
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Figure 4: Number of stable matchings versus market size and
percentage of couples present in the market. Box represents
average number of stable matchings; whisker represents one
standard deviation
matching exists (and hence it is an Ropt matching), that is
no guarantee of strategy-proofness on either the residents’ or
programs’ side for SMP-C.
Nevertheless, we have also shown that if residents are only
allowed to truncate their preferences (which is arguably the
easiest misreporting strategy), then they have no incentive to
misreport if an Ropt matching exists. Since an Ropt match-
ing can exist even when there more than one stable matching,
this can be a useful situation that covers more cases than hav-
ing only one stable matching.
Figure 4 shows our results about this question. The boxes
in this plot represents the average number of stable matches
for different problem parameters; the whisker represents one
standard deviation. For the problems we investigated, the av-
erage number of stable matchings was quite low (1.30), and
did not seem to be affected much by either the size of the
market, or the percentage of couples involved in the market.
Note that exceedingly few problem instances have more than
3 stable matches, no matter how the parameters are set. Also,
in each setting of the parameters, problem instances with one
and two stable matchings are very common. Note that, unlike
the previous analysis presented in Figure 2, we are looking at
all problem instances, not just the satisfiable ones.
In the problems we investigated, 10.63% had no stable
matching, 61.91% had a unique stable matching, 21.89%
had two stable matchings, 0.31% had three stable match-
ings, 4.69% had four stable matchings, 0.13% had six stable
matchings, and 0.44% had eight stable matchings.
When a problem instance has more than one stable match-
ing, we are particularly interested in how many RPopt
matchings exist. If only one RPopt matching exists this
matching is also an Ropt matching, and our theoretical re-
sult applies: residents have no incentive to misreport their
preferences by truncation. 78.5% of all problem instances
drawn had an Ropt matching, which is many more instances
than simply had a single stable matching (61.91%). Addition-
0 5000 10000 15000 20000
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Market size
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 s
at
is
fia
bl
e 
in
st
an
ce
s 
w
ith
 R
op
t m
at
ch
in
g
1%
5%
10%
20%
Figure 5: Fraction of satisfiable instances with an Ropt
matching, varying size of the market and percentage of cou-
ples in the market.
ally, if we again look at the Immorlica and Mahdian results,
but with respect to fraction of satisfiable instance that had
an Ropt matching instead of the more restrictive condition
of having only one stable matchings, we see a trend much
closer to what we might expect. See Figure 5. Furthermore,
many instances with a low percentage of couples almost al-
ways had an Ropt matching; when the market had 1% cou-
ples, 98.5% of all satisfiable instances had an Ropt match-
ing; with 5%, 92.7% had anRopt matching. Importantly, this
means that for many of the problem instances that we drew,
residents have no incentive to misreport their preferences via
truncation. However, further investigation is required to as-
certain the relationship between the percentage of couples in
a matching and the fraction of instances that have an Ropt
matching.
Finally, looked at those instances with more than one stable
matching to see how many, on average, RPopt matchings
they contain. We found that in some cases RPopt matchings
are quite common. When there are two stable matchings for a
given problem instance, there were an average of 1.36RPopt
matchings per problem. Instances with 3 stable matchings
always had 3 RPopt matchings per problem. Instances with
4 stable matchings had an average of 1.69 RPopt matchings
per problem, and instances with 8 stable matchings had an
average of 4RPopt per problem.
5.3 Structure of SMP-C Problem Instances
In this section we examine some finer grained structure
among the set of stable matchings. We examined the sta-
ble matchings and a basis for the set of Pareto improving
moves. A Pareto improving move is the set of resident trans-
fers needed to transform matching µ2 to matching µ1 when
µ1 R µ2 (i.e., the transfers improve the match). Improving
moves that are the result of combining other improving are
not counted as part of the basis.
We show this structure as a directed graph, where nodes are
stable matchings for a given instance, and an edge goes from
node a to b if there is a Pareto improving move transforming
Figure 6: Pareto Improvement graph for one problem in-
stance, with 8 stable matchings, and 2 RPopt matchings.
Square denotes the matching KPR and RP99 found.
a to b. (Note this implies that b R a. Note this graph is not
guaranteed to be connected, and in practice, many of these
graphs have multiple components. By definition, each com-
ponent will contain at least one RPopt matching. While it
appears to be exceedingly rare for any component to contain
more than one component (at least in the problems we gener-
ated), we did find one component with twoRPopt matchings.
For an illustration of what these components and the pos-
sible Pareto improving moves may look like, see Figure 6.
For the problem instance chosen, there were 8 stable match-
ings, 2 of which were RPopt matchings. Each node in the
graph contains a tuple of the singles’ and couples’ average
rank; each edge on the graph is the maximum improvement
for any single and any couple from the previous match to the
new Pareto improved match.
Also note that in this problem instance, on average, one of
these RPopt matchings is better for couples (by 0.03 posi-
tions on average) and one of theseRPopt matchings is better
for singles (by 0.0002 positions on average). Interestingly,
there are very few unique Pareto optimal moves in this graph;
there are only two. This tends to hold in general; when there
are two stable matchings, there are an average of 0.64 unique
Pareto moves per problem. With 4 stable matchings, there are
an average of 1.48 Pareto moves.
Note that, for the single that has the greatest incentive to
go from one matching to another, they have quite a high
incentive—almost their entire ROL. (Remember, singles give
a ROL of size 5.) Note that Figure 6 shows a case where only
single residents improve; this is not true in the general case.
Couples, likewise, can greatly benefit from moving from a
non-Pareto optimal matching to a RPopt matching. Addi-
tionally, some singles and couples will strongly prefer one
RPopt matching over another; in this example, the maximum
incentive for any single to switch from the RPopt matching
on the left to the one on the right is moving up their ROL 3
positions. In this example, there is no incentive for couples to
switch from theRPopt matching on the left to the one on the
right. For switching from the RPopt matching on the right
to the one on the left, the maximum incentive for any single
to move is one position in their ROL, and 3 positions for any
couple. In this instance, both of the DA algorithms KPR and
RP99 found the sameRPopt matching, denoted by the square
node in the graph. While KPR and RP99 are not guaranteed
to find anRPopt matching, they did in this instance.
While in this example, there is little incentive to switch
from one RPopt matching to another, there were instances
%RPopt found % Total Timeouts
% Couples KPR RP99 KPR RP99
1 100.00 100.00 0.00 0.00
5 94.54 96.16 0.25 0.75
10 88.66 89.58 0.25 6.25
20 91.42 90.24 5.57 36.26
Table 1: DA algorithms performance versus percentage of
couples in a match. For %RPopt found, only problems with
more than one stable matching that did not timeout were con-
sidered. For % Total timeouts, all problems with at least one
stable matching were considered.
in the data where at least one single could move up their en-
tire preference list by switching from one RPopt matching
to another, and at least one couple could move up their en-
tire preference list by switching from one RPopt matching
to another.
5.4 The Performance of DA Algorithms for
SMP-C
We are also interested in how the standard DA-style algo-
rithms perform with respect to findingRPopt matchings. As
Roth and Peranson mention that resident optimality is an im-
portant design aspect for stable matching algorithms, we in-
vestigate how frequently the DA algorithms find a RPopt
matching. We do this by using Algo 1 to enumerate all pos-
sible stable matchings for each problem instance. We then
identify all RPopt matchings, and then see if the DA algo-
rithms find a RPopt matching for that instance. Table 5.4
shows these results. We did not find much of a relation-
ship between the size of the problem and how frequently the
DA algorithms found anRPopt matching, so we combine all
problem sizes for this analysis. Note that, when analyzing the
% of times the DA algorithm found an RPopt matching, we
only look at problems where (a) more than one stable match-
ing exists (if only one stable matching exists, that solution is
automatically anRPopt matching) and (b) the DA algorithm
found a matching (the DA algorithms have different failure
rates and we wanted to directly compare only when they suc-
ceed.) Table 5.4 also shows the general failure rate for the DA
algorithms (i.e., when at least one stable matching exists, but
the algorithm fails to find one).
Critically, note that even though the DA algorithms were
designed to be as resident favoring as possible, they do not
find an RPopt matching in a large percentage of problems
with multiple stable matchings. When the percentage of cou-
ples is low, the DA algorithms’ performance is either perfect,
or fairly good (with about a 5% failure rate). For problems
with roughly the same percentage of couples as the NRMP
(roughly 6%) the failure rate of KPR and RP99 to find a
RPopt matching is fairly low, at 5% (though KPR’s failure
rate is slightly higher.) However, with more couples in the
match, the failure rate jumps to roughly 10%. Again, in all
of these settings, SAT-E with the additional constraints was
able to enumerate all stable matchings, including all RPopt
matchings.
It appears as though RP99 finds an RPopt matching with
a slightly higher rate than KPR when it finishes. These two
algorithms deal with couples fairly differently (as RP99 has
couples propose individually, and couples propose in-batch in
KPR), which could account for the difference in performance.
However, KPR outperforms RP99 by a large margin with re-
spect to the percentage of problem instances solved. KPR’s
failure rate is less than 0.25% for all problems with 10% or
less couples, and only 5.75% when the match has 20% cou-
ples. RP99’s failure rate grows quickly, reaching 36.25% by
the time couples consist of 20% of the market. Therefore, it
seems as though there is a slight benefit to using RP99 to find
RPopt matchings, but its large failure rate may negate this
benefit.
6 Discussion and Future Work
In this paper, we have provided new theoretical results on
strategy-proofness for SMP-C, and new extensions to an ex-
isting SAT encoding for SMP-C that allows us to both enu-
merate every stable matching for a given problem instance,
and guarantee that we’ve found aRPopt matching if we don’t
have the resources to enumerate all instances. We then used
these techniques to explore properties of SMP-C instances.
We used these tools to empirically investigate previous the-
oretical results. Interesting, and perhaps unexpectedly, the
Immorlica and Mahdian results (given a constant list size,
the probability of a unique stable matching goes to one as
the market size increases) did not seem to hold. However,
we empirically found evidence for a related phenomenon for
SMP-C, leading us to the following conjecture: for problem
instances drawn from the same distribution with a fixed ROL
size of k, the probability of a resident optimal stable matching
goes to one as the size of the market goes to infinity.
We also empirically evaluated RP99 and KPR, two DA-
style algorithms for SMP-C that do not have any theoretical
guarantees. While they frequently perform well on the prob-
lem instances we drew, we found many problem instances
where they either did not find a stable matching at all even
though one existed, or if they did find one, they did not find
a RPopt matching. In practice, it would be a simple to use
our algorithm 2 to improve the matching found by these al-
gorithms.
By enumerating all possible stable matchings (and thus all
resident Pareto optimal matchings for a given matching), we
can now pick stable matchings based on certain properties.
Enumerating the set of all stable matchings allows us to pick
the matching with the best average rank for all singles and
couples (a sort of resident social-welfare optimal matching),
or the stable matching that places the worst-off individual as
high in their preference rankings as possible. While we did
not empirically evaluate this in this paper, being able to enu-
merate all stable matchings allows for a rich investigation into
this problem.
Our overall conclusion is that encoding to SAT is a pow-
erful tool for further empirical analysis of stable matching
problems. The research question that arises is how best to use
this tool and how this tool can be adapted to obtain insight
into other important open questions about NP-complete sta-
ble matching problems. The current paper has shown that
this tool has already exposed some interesting theoretical
questions. For example, what can be proved about the fre-
quency in which resident-optimal matchings appear in ran-
domly drawn SMP-C instances as the market size increases;
is there further structure to the set of RPopt solutions; can
the existence of a resident-optimal matching or conditions on
the set of RPopt solutions be used to prove further strategy-
proof results for SMP-C.
In addition to theoretical results, there is considerable po-
tential for practical computation of stable matchings. For ex-
ample, using both DA algorithms, and algorithm 2 to improve
the resulting matching might have some very useful appli-
cations. It might also be the case that solving SAT-E with
additional constraints might be applicable to some currently
unsolved practical matching problems.
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A SAT Encoding for the Stable Matching
Problem with Couples
In this appendix we provide an encoding of SMP-C into SAT.
SMP-C was shown to be an NP-Complete problem by Ronn
[Ronn, 1990]. Hence, it can be encoded and solved as a
satisfiability problem (SAT). This is an attractive approach
for solving SMP-C due to the recent tremendous advances in
SAT solvers.
The encoding of SMP-C we give here forms the basis of
Drummond et al. [2015]. Nevertheless, since we extend this
SAT encoding in order to find Pareto optimal matchings and
to find all stable matchings, we provide its details in this ap-
pendix (which will only be available on-line).
First we assume that the doctor (singles and couples) rols
have been preprocessed so as to remove from them any pro-
gram that does not find that doctor acceptable. For d ∈ S we
remove p from rold if d /∈ rolp. For couple (d1, d2) ∈ C we
remove (p1, p2) from rol (d1,d2) if d1 /∈ rolp1 or d2 /∈ rolp2 .
This ensures that in any matching found by solving the SAT
encoding no doctor d can be matched into a program that does
not rank d.
A SAT encoding consists of a set of Boolean variables and
a collection of clauses over these variables. We first describe
the set of variables and their intended meaning, and then we
present the clauses which enforce the conditions required for
a stable matching.
A.1 Variables
We utilize three sets of Boolean variables.
1. Doctor Matching Variables:
{md[p] | d ∈ D ∧ p ∈ rold}
md[p] is true iff d is matched into program p. Note that
md[nil ] is true if d is unmatched.
2. Couple Matching Variables:
{mc[i] | c ∈ C ∧ (0 ≤ i < |rolc|)}
mc[i] is true iff couple c is matched into a program pair (p, p′)
that it ranks between 0 and i, i.e., 0 ≤ rank c((p, p′)) ≤ i.
(Lower ranks are more preferred).
3. Program Matching Variables:
{mp[i, s] | p ∈ P ∧ (0 ≤ i ≤ |rolp| − 2)
∧ (0 ≤ s ≤ min(i+ 1, capp + 1))}
mp[i, s] is true iff s of the doctors in rolp[0] to rolp[i] have
been matched into p. Note that i ranges up to |rolp|−2 which
is the index the last non-nil doctors on rolp (rolp is termi-
nated by nil ).
The program matching variables are the main innovation of
our encoding. These variables are especially designed to al-
low us express more efficiently the constraints a stable match-
ing must satisfy.
A.2 Clauses
Now we give the clauses of the encoding. Rather than give
the more lengthy clauses directly, we often give higher level
constraints whose CNF encoding is straightforward.
Unique Match A doctor must be matched into exactly one
program (possibly the nil program). For all d ∈ D
1a at-most-one({md[p]|p ∈ ranked(d)})
1b
∨
p∈ranked(d)md[p]
The at-most-one constraint simply states that at most one
of a set of Boolean variables is allowed to be true. It can be
converted to CNF in a number of different ways. 1b ensures
that some match (possibly to the nil program) is made.
Couple Match The mc[∗] variables must have their in-
tended meaning. For all couples c ∈ C , for all k such that
1 ≤ k ≤ |rolc|, letting c = (d1, d2) and (p1[i], p2[i]) =
rolc[i],
2a mc[0] ≡ md1 [p1[0]] ∧md2 [p2[0]]
2b mc[k] ≡ (md1 [p1[k]] ∧md2 [p2[k]]) ∨mc[k − 1]
2c mc[|rolc|]
The final condition ensures that c is matched to some program
pair on its rol (possibly nil ), and the at-most-one constraint
for d1 and d2 ensures that c is uniquely matched.
Program Match The mp[∗, ∗] variables must have their in-
tended meaning. For all programs p ∈ P , for all i such
that 1 ≤ i ≤ |rolp| − 2, and for all s such that 0 ≤ s ≤
min(i+ 1, capp + 1), letting di = rolp[i] (the i-th doctor on
p’s rol ),
3a
(
mp[0, 0] ≡ ¬md0 [p]
) ∧ (mp[0, 1] ≡ md0 [p])
3b mp[i, s] ≡ (mp[i−1, s]∧¬mdi [p]) ∨
(mp[i−1, s−1]∧mdi [p])
3c ¬mp[i, capp + 1]
The last condition, captured by a set of unit clauses, ensures
that p’s quota is not exceeded at any stage. Falsifying these
variables along with the other clauses ensures that no more
matches can be made into p once p hits its quota. Note that
i only indexes up to the last non-nil doctor on rolp since nil
does not use up any program capacity.
Stability for Singles For each single doctor, d ∈ S and for
each p ∈ rold
4
(∨
p′dpmd[p
′]
) ∨mp[rankp(d)− 1, capp ]
This clause says that if d has not been matched into a pro-
gram preferred to or equal to p, then it must be the case that
p will not accept d. Note that mp[rankp(d)− 1, capp ] means
that p has been filled to capacity with doctors coming before
d on its rol .
Stability for Couples (A) For each couple c = (d1, d2) ∈
C and for each (p1, p2) ∈ rolc with p1 6= p2
5a1 md1 [p1] ∧ ¬mc[rankc((p1, p2))]
=⇒ mp2 [rankp2(d2)− 1, capp2 ]
5a2 md2 [p2] ∧ ¬mc[rankc((p1, p2))]
=⇒ mp1 [rankp1(d1)− 1, capp1 ]
5b ¬md1 [p1] ∧ ¬md2 [p2] ∧ ¬mc[rankc((p1, p2))] =⇒
mp1 [rankp1(d1)− 1, capp1 ] ∨mp2 [rankp2(d2)− 1, capp2 ]
Clause 5a1 says that when d1 is already matched to p1 but
c has not been matched into (p1, p2) or into a more preferred
program pair, then it must be the case that p2 will not accept
d2. 5a2 is analogous.
Clause 5b says that if neither d1 nor d2 is matched into p1
or p2 and c has not been matched into (p1, p2) or into a more
preferred program pair, then either p1 will not accept d1 or p2
will not accept d2.
Stability for Couples (B) For each couple c = (d1, d2) ∈
C and for each (p, p) ∈ rolc we have one of constraint 6a1
or 6b1. 6a1 is needed when d1 p d2, while 6b1 is needed
when d2 p d1.
6a1 md1 [p] ∧ ¬mc[rankc((p, p))] =⇒
mp[rankp(d2)− 1, capp ]
6b1 md1 [p] ∧ ¬mc[rankc((p, p))] =⇒
mp[rankp(d1)− 1, capp − 1]
6c ¬md1 [p] ∧ ¬md2 [p] ∧ ¬mc[rankc((p, p))] =⇒
mp[rankp(d1)−1, capp ] ∨mp[rankp(d1)−1, capp−1]
∨mp[rankp(d2)−1, capp ] ∨mp[rankp(d2)−1, capp−1]
Clauses 6a1 or 6b1 say that if d1 is already in p and c is not
matched to (p, p) or into a more preferred program pair, then
p will not accept d2. 6b1 differs because when d2 p d1 and
d1 is already in p, p will definitely accept d2. In this case,
however, the couple is not accepted into (p, p) if accepting
d2 causes d1 to be bumped. That is, when mp[rankp(d1) −
1, capp − 1] is true (adding d2 will cause mp[rankp(d1) −
1, capp ] to become true).
There are also analogous clauses 6a2 and 6b2 (one of
which is used) to deal with the case when d2 is already in
p and we need to ensure that p won’t accept d1. Clause 6c
handles the case when neither member of the couple is cur-
rently matched into p.
Let P = 〈D ,C ,P ,〉 be a matching problem. We say
that a matching µ for P and a truth assignment pi for SAT-E
of P are corresponding when pi |= md[p] iff µ(d) = p.
We provide a full proof of the following theorem in Drum-
mond et al. [2015].
Theorem 2. If µ and pi are corresponding, then µ is stable if
and only if pi is satisfying.
This theorem shows that the satisfying assignments of
SAT-E are in a 1-1 relationship with the stable models.
